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THE 200-MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE:
DEATH KNELL FOR THE AMERICAN
TUNA INDUSTRY
While man can agree to respect each other's laws, it is more dif-
ficult to make the fishes of the sea obey.'
INTRODUCTION
From time immemorial fishermen have sought the highly migra-
tory tuna.2 Today, among the fishing fleets of forty nations that
pursue this elusive and unpredictable fish,3 the most modem
and efficient is the United States' fleet, which boasts over 135 large
tuna clippers.4 Although the majority of these vessels sail from
1. The World of Tuna, a film prepared for the Tuna Research Founda-
tion for presentation at the Law of the Sea Conference, Caracas, 1974, the
transcript of which appears in Hearings on extending the jurisdiction of the
United States beyond the present twelve-mile fishery zone Before the Sub-
comm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
93-37, at 714 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Fishery Hearings].
2. Of the more than a dozen species found in the temperate and tropical
oceans of the world, the most important are the yellowfin, skipjack, alba-
core, bigeye, and bluefin. Although similar in habits and appearance, tuna
vary widely in size: skipjack rarely exceed 25 pounds, and albacore, 60
to 70 pounds; by contrast, yellowfin and bigeye may grow as large as 300
pounds, and bluefin grow even larger. Nevertheless, each species is com-
monly represented in commercial landings by specimens of less than ten
pounds. Howard, Tuna Harvest, FismNG NEws INT'L, Apr. 1962, at 22.
3. The tuna swims at speeds up to 45 miles per hour, often crossing
oceans in vast migrations several times during its life span. Scientists be-
lieve the migrations result from the tuna's search for warm ocean currents
to suit its unique physiology-it is one of the few fishes whose body temper-
ture is higher than that of the water in which it lives-and from its pur-
suit of new concentrations of the phytoplankton which sustain its food
chain. The World of Tuna, in 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 714.
Three of the five important species-yellowfin, skipjack, and bigeye-are
tropical in occurrence and are found in quantity only where water is 20'
C. or warmer, although skipjack sometimes appear in somewhat cooler
water. These tropical species respond directly to seasonal temperature
changes at the extremes of their ranges. In the summer, when the cor-
responding warm isotherms move unusually far north in the northern hem-
isphere or south in the southern hemisphere, so do these fish. Howard,
supra note 2, at 22.
4. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 1974 Annual Report 139
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tunas they seek rarely venture north to the cool waters of the Cali-
fornia coast. Because of their migratory patterns, United States
fishermen must pursue these tuna in the warm, tropical waters
off the coasts of Latin America and Africa. While the laws of
nature govern the course of these elusive tuna, the laws of man
govern those who seek them. Yet a present transformation of the
latter threatens to alter the future both of fish and of fishermen.
THE 200-MiLE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZoNE TREND
Most nations favored the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
concept at the first substantive session of the Third United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference at Caracas in 1974.0 But impatient
with the painstakingly slow progress of multilateral negotiations7
and spurred by the severe depletion of eastern coastal fishing stocks
by foreign fishermen,8 the United States Congress is moving rapidly
(1975) [hereinafter cited as IATTC, 1974 Report]. "Our modern fleet of
tuna seiners represents an efficient and prestigious element in world fishing
circles unmatched by the Soviets, Japan or any other major fishing nations
." G. Broadhead & C. Peckham, The Potential Economic Impact of
a 200-Mile Fishery Zone on the United States Fisheries for Tuna, Shrimp
and Salmon 1, June 1974 (a study prepared by Living Marine Resources,
Inc. for the Tuna Research Foundation) [hereinafter cited as LMR Study],
in Hearings on extending the jurisdiction of the United States beyond the
present twelve-mile fishery zone Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-4, at 483-90 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 Fishery Hearings].
5. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 834 (J. Tarantino). In 1972,
San Diego based tunaboats represented 90 percent of the United States high
seas tuna fleet. Economic Research Bureau of San Diego, Spotlight on Fish-
ing 1, Oct. 1973 (from San Diego Chamber of Commerce).
6. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 87 (statement by Hon. John
N. Moore); Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic
Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569, 570 (1975); cf.
Pollard, The Exclusive Economic Zone-The Elusive Consensus, 12 SAN
DEGo L. REv. 600 (1975). Over 100 of the 138 States represented supported
the 200-mile zone concept. Stevenson, Foreword, Law of the Sea VII, 12
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 491 (1975). But see 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4,
at 457-58 (statement of August Felando, General Manager, American Tuna-
boat Association).
7. Hon. John R. Stevenson, Former Chief, United States Delegation, ob-
served that the Geneva session "achieved a very considerable degree of
progress; however, not as much progress as our Delegation had hoped or
as the pressures for prompt agreement on a new law of the sea demand."
Hearings on Geneva Session of the United Nations Law of the Sea Confer-
ence Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-30, at 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Geneva Hearings].
8. See 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 233-349, 377-430; 1974
Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 1-338, 507-82; Hearings on S. 380, S.
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toward unilateral declaration of a 200-mile economic zone for the
protection of coastal fisheries 9 -in spite of an almost certain presi-
dential veto.'0  Although the proposed legislation" expressly
exempts highly migratory species from the 200-mile zone, tuna
fishermen fear that other nations will overlook this exception and
will move to extend their jurisdiction to all fish located in their
economic zones, whether coastal, anadromous, or highly migra-
tory.1 2  The tuna fishermen argue that other nations, following
1988, S. 2338 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-54, pt. 3, at 833-910 [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on S. 380]. For a graphic example of Soviet deple-
tion of haddock see id. at 906-07. For the lighter side, see Neary, Of
Flounderburgers and the Fisherman's Dilemma, SATURDAY REV., DEC. 4,
1973, at 19. The September 28, 1975 agreement of 17 member nations of
the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries to reduce
fishing efforts in the North Atlantic by 40 percent, however, may reduce
the urgency or even the necessity of further protecting these stocks by
unilateral declaration of a 200-mile fishery zone. The Wall Street J., Sept.
29, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (pac. ed.); Evening Tribune (San Diego), Sept. 29, 1975,
at A-11, col. 1.
9. On October 9, 1975, the House of Representatives voted 208 to 101
to unilaterally extend United States jurisdiction over coastal and anadrom-
ous fisheries within 200 miles of the coast. Although the Senate passed sim-
ilar legislation last year, and the Senate Commerce Committee has again
approved it, the Administration opposes the bill on the ground that it would
hamper agreement on the fisheries question at the United Nations Con-
ference on Law of the Sea. The Wall Street J., Oct. 10, 1975, at 13, col.
1 (pac. ed.).
10. [T]he President and Secretary of State are strongly opposed to
a 200-mile fisheries bill that right now is before the House ....
[Such legislation is likely to pass both the House and the Senate]
and our President then has to make a decision about a veto. I
think it is important to know that the President has, in both Maine
and in the state of Washington, stated that he is opposed to a uni-
lateral assertion of a 200-mile fishery zone. [T]hat is not a very
popular thing to say in those two states, but it's the correct thing
to do .... [H]e prefers to negotiate a 200-mile limit. Address
by Myron Nordquist, U.S. Dep't of State Alternative Representative
on the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, San Diego
County Bar Association Luncheon, San Diego, Cal., Oct. 7, 1975.
11. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
12. "I think your argument really is . . . that although [H.R. 200 ex-
empts highly migratory species], it is subtlety that would be lost on the
other nations who would use it as a pretext to take action of their own."
1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 455 (Congressman Studds' recapitu-
lation of Mr. Felando's testimony). Mr. Felando was right. Merely bringing
H.R. 200 to the floor of the House for a vote prompted Mexico to declare a
200-mile exclusive economic zone on October 7, 1975. In calling for the
zone's passage earlier this year, President Echeverria stated: "We would
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the lead of the United States, will act unilaterally without the
highly migratory exclusion, thereby depriving them of their fishing
grounds and bringing their industry to an end.13
Until recently, the United States, refusing to recognize any
territorial claim to coastal seas beyond three miles, has strongly
opposed unilateral assertions of jurisdiction to 200 miles. 14 Yet,
at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, the United
States modified this position, stating that it would accept a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone as part of an overall treaty pack-
age 15 which included special exceptions for highly migratory
species.' 6 These exceptions, however, won little support at Gen-
consider tuna fish as part of the economic zone resources, I am sure."
Compare The Wall Street J., Oct. 8, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (pac. ed.), with The
San Diego Union, Sept. 2, 1975, at A-1, col. 2.
13. "A U.S. 200-mile zone sets us up for retaliation by all other coastal
nations . . . ." 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 736 (statement of
Charles Carry, Executive Director, Tuna Research Foundation). See note
32 infra. For additional tuna fishermen's views see 1975 Fishery Hearings,
supra note 4, at 440-69, 481-99, 571-615; 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note
1, at 701-842; Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 461-598, 700-66. Shrimp
fishermen and many salmon fishermen also oppose this legislation: "It is
our . . .belief that enactment of this legislation would immediately pre-
cipitate similar action by the Republic of Mexico thereby denying the gulf
shrimp industry a major portion of their [sic] traditional shrimping
waters." Id. at 667 (statement of Robert G. Mauermann, Executive Direc-
tor, Texas Shrimp Association). As to the accuracy of Mr. Mauermann's
prediction, see note 12 supra. For shrimp fishermen's views see generally
1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 469-81; 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra
note 1, at 339-506, 583-700; Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 653-79.
For salmon fishermen's views see generally 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra
note 4, at 514-24; 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 824-29; Hear-
ings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 680-95; Hearings on S. 380, S. 1988,
S. 2338 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-54, pt. 2, at 185-459
(1974).
14. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 89, 96 (J. Moore). For a sum-
mary of recent coastal State unilateral extensions of fishery jurisdiction, see
id. at 110. The most recent examples are Costa Rica, which asserted juris-
diction over tuna fishing within 200 miles (see Letter from Harold F. Cary
to President Gerald Ford, July 25, 1975, in exhibit 3 to H. Cary, infra note
57), Mexico (see note 12 supra), and Iceland, which on October 14, 1975,
extended its claimed 50-mile fishing zone to 200 miles. Evening Tribune
(San Diego), Oct. 15, 1975, at A-11, col. 3.
15. The package includes a 12-mile territorial sea, a 200-mile economic
zone, innocent passage within the territorial sea, free transit through inter-
national straits, a definite outer boundary for the continental shelf, and re-
tention of the traditional concept of high seas beyond the 12-mile territorial
sea. 1975 Geneva Hearings, supra note 7, at 53. Should essential features
of the package fail to gain approval, it is doubtful the United States would
continue its 200-mile exclusive economic zone support.
16. E.g., Special Considerations Regarding the Management of Anadrom-
ous Fisheries and Highly Migratory Oceanic Fisheries in Hearings on S.
380, supra note 8, at 567-73.
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eva. 17 Whether brought about by comprehensive treaty or by
unilateral action, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone seems inevit-
able."" If established by treaty, the zone will have uniform
application and may include, though this is far from certain, 19
special exemptions for highly migratory fish.20 If created by uni-
lateral declaration, however, the various zones are likely to be
diverse, arbitrary, and unduly restrictive to distant-water fishing
nations.21
The term "exclusive economic zone" has been used in two ways.
One use denotes complete control by the coastal State over all
resources within the zone. A second-the way the United States
seems to use it-means full control by the coastal State with cer-
tain exceptions, i.e., special treatment for highly migratory fish.
This Comment employs the first meaning, focusing on exclusive
fishing rights.22
The trend toward universal acceptance of the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone concept demonstrates that it is not unreasonable to
hypothesize the existence of such zones on a global basis. There-
17. 1975 Geneva Hearings, supra note 7, at 4 (J. Stevenson).
18. See text accompanying notes 6 & 9 supra.
19. Cf. 1975 Geneva Hearings, supra note 7, at 54 (A. Felando).
20. Incorporation of the desired special considerations for highly migra-
tory species, of course, would minimize the impact of the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone upon the tuna industry. For the purposes of this article,
however, nonincorporation is assumed.
21. While nations acting together are often willing to subordinate certain
national interests to the group interest for the sake of agreement, no such
moderating force obtains in unilateral action. In the name of national inter-
est, a state acting unilaterally is likely to claim far greater sovereignty than
it considers essential to that interest. California Congressman Glenn
Anderson shares this view:
[D] on't you think that if we adopted ... the 200-mile economic
zone, that it would open the door to any other country to come
out and say, "We are going to claim 200 miles just like you did,
and claim everything." I think it would just confuse the entire
world. We would have lines going out for fishing zones in one
country; maybe total sovereignty in another; and economic in an-
other. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 752.
Concerning the various unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral actions coastal
States may take in the event of failure to conclude a comprehensive law of
the sea treaty, see Knight, Alternatives to a Law of the Sea Treaty, in 1975
Geneva Hearings, supra note 7, at 67, 69.
22. Other aspects of the exclusive economic zone, such as mineral rights
and restrictions on navigation, lie beyond the scope of this study and are
treated only insofar as they bear on the question of fishing rights.
fore, this Comment assumes for analytical purposes the universal
adoption-either by unilateral or multilateral means-of 200-mile
exclusive economic zones. 23  It uses, as a primary vehicle for
analysis, the Southern California tuna fleet and fishermen, whose
response to the imposition of 200-mile limits on a global basis is
of vital interest both to the local community2 4 and, by extension,
to the national commercial fishing industry.25 Finally, it views
the tuna problem in its global context, evaluates possible solutions
and makes recommendations.
THE SIGNIFICANCE o TUNA FIsHING GRouNDs
AND TECHNIQUES
The United States distant-water tuna fishery will be seriously
damaged by the adoption of 200-mile zones because of the location
of its fishing grounds and the fishing methods it employs. The
fleet's prime fishing grounds lie in the coastal waters of the
Eastern Pacific from Mexico to Chile. When these grounds are
closed,26 the fleet turns to its alternate sources in the Gulf of
Guinea off the western coast of Africa and in the Central Pacific
from about 1200 to 150' west longitude.27 In spite of increasing
23. On the varieties and merits of 200-mile zones, see generally Alex-
ander & Hodgson, supra note 6; Garcia-Amador, Latin American Contribu-
tion to the Development of the Law of the Sea, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 33 (1974);
Pollard, supra note 6.
24. Many San Diegans depend upon the tuna industry for their liveli-
hood. That this livelihood is permanently and seriously threatened by the
200-mile zone trend in law of the sea is only just becoming apparent. This
new threat imports more than just the harassment of crews and boat owners
by Ecuador and Peru; it concerns recognizing as legitimate their territorial
claims, and with them, the claims of all the other Latin American and Afri-
can coastal countries. Such recognition and resulting exclusion from prime
fishing zones could ultimately force total relocation of the California tuna
industry.
25. Catches of the Southern California tuna fleet in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific accounted for 98.9 percent of all yellowfin and skipjack landings
and 87.1 percent of all tuna landings in the United States in 1974. Compare
IATTC, 1974 Report, supra note 4, at 25-27, 137, with NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CuRRmNT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 6700,
FISHERIES OF THE U.S., 1974, at 15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NMFS,
STATISTICS].
26. As required by the Commission's resolution, unrestricted fishing
for yellowfin in the CYRA [Commission's Yellowfin Regulatory
Area] is terminated at such time as the amount of yellowfin al-
ready taken, plus the expected catch by vessels which are in port
or at sea with permission to fish without restriction, reaches the
quota for the year .... The closure date during 1974 was at 0001
hours on March 18. The corresponding dates for the previous years
were September 15, 1966, June 24, 1967, June 18, 1968, April 16,
1969, March 23, 1970, April 9, 1971, March 5, 1972, and March 8,
1973. IATTC, 1974 Report, supra note 4, at 25.
27. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 517 (C. Carry); Interview with
[VOL. 13: 707, 1976] Comments
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catches in the Central Pacific, however, the eastern margins of the
tropical oceans remain the only areas where major live-bait and
purse seine fisheries for tropical tunas occur all year.
28
Both live-bait fishing2 9 and purse seining 3 0-- the primary methods
employed by United States tuna fishermen-are shallow water
fishing techniques which depend upon large schools of tuna swim-
ming near the surface. These methods are most efficient in waters
near the coast, where surface tuna are found in greatest abundance.
As fishermen venture farther from the coast of Latin America, the
tuna supply dwindles, and poorer weather decreases the number
of fishing days.31 Thus, live-bait fishing and purse seining become
August Felando, General Manager, American Tunaboat Association, in San
Diego, California, Nov. 7, 1975. Tropical tunas inhabit these areas because
the circulation of ocean currents produces a broad belt of temperate water
offshore and a narrow belt of tropical water inshore at the eastern extremes
of the equatorial zones of the oceans. Inside the narrow tropical belt, tuna
dwell above the thermocline in the warm mixed layer some 50 to 200 feet
thick. Howard, supra note 2, at 26. See figures 1 and 2 for areas of greatest
yellowfin and skipjack concentration.
28. Howard, supra note 2, at 26. For variations with respect to skipjack,
see BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR
No. 165, SKIPJACK-A WORLD RESOURCE (1963), which relies on the Howard
article.
29. Pole-and-line or live-bait fishing requires that a school of tuna be
attracted to the side of the vessel by chumming with live bait. Once along-
side, the tuna strike not only at the bait fish but also at baited barbless
hooks or feathered jigs suspended by lines from short bamboo poles, which
the fishermen use to haul them abroad. Johnson, The Pacific Coast Tuna
Fleet, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, June 1964, at 57. This method
has two major drawbacks: the time spent catching bait reduces overall ef-
ficiency and the problems of bait supply and preservation restrict fishing
operations to waters near the coast. Howard, supra note 2, at 25; Hearings
on S. 380, supra note 8, at 571.
30. Purse seiners employ an encircling net from 500 to 700 fathoms long
and 40 to 60 fathoms deep to catch tuna that run in schools near the surface.
The tuna are captured by surrounding the school, pursing the bottom of
the net, concentrating the catch in a small area, and brailing (hauling) the
tuna aboard with huge dip nets. Johnson, supra note 29 (net sizes updated
by Interview with August Felando, supra note 27). Purse seiners usually
fish in waters beyond the 100 fathom curve, where the supply of surface
tuna is generally abundant. For a comprehensive treatment of purse sein-
ing, see McNeeley, The Purse Seine Revolution in Tuna Fishing, PACIFIC
FISHERmAN, June 1961, at 27.
31. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 805 (A. Felando); cf. IATTC,
1974 Report, supra note 8, at 33. Offshore winds, higher seas, and tropical
storms occur with much greater frequency in the region beyond 200 miles.
BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 21-24; see Hearings on
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largely unprofitable beyond the 200-mile limit.3 2
For years the Southern California fishermen, who developed the
Eastern Pacific tuna grounds, fished from baitboats. With the
development of the nylon net and the power block 33 in the mid-
1950's, purse seining proved more efficient, and the tuna fleet began
to convert their baitboats and to build new seiners at a phenomenal
rate.34 Today the large purse seiners of the California tuna fleet
outnumber the baitboats two to one and carry, on the average, eight
times as much tuna.35 Together, they harvest the young skipjack
and yellowfin ranging in age from 18 months to four years and in
weight from about ten to 150 pounds.36 Since the older, larger tunas
which dwell in deeper mid-ocean waters generally do not concen-
trate in surface waters, they are harvested by Japanese, Korean,
and Taiwanese fishermen using the longline technique.37 Longline
fishing, the predominant fishing method of the Japanese, accounts
for over half the world's tuna catch. United States fishermen, how-
ever, have found this method unprofitable because of the extensive
labor involved in constantly setting and hauling in the longlines.3 s
Thus, United States tuna fishing operations are mainly restricted
to waters near the coast by the combined constraints of source of
supply, fishing techniques and weather. Approximately 80 percent
32. Cf. Mr. Felando's statement: "[WJe are faced with a denial of
access to fishing grounds that, in effect, would destroy us economically."
1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 444.
33. The main advantage of the power block is the time saved in
making sets, particularly unsuccessful ones which account for about
half of the total and now take an hour instead of two. Nylon nets
are handled more easily, need less care and do not deteriorate as
rapidly as do cotton nets. Howard, supra note 2, at 25.
34. The converted baitboats proved twice as efficient. This provided a
tremendous stimulus both to the tunaboat owners who had experienced
marginal profits, and often losses, between 1953 and 1959, and to the fisher-
men who had seen their earnings slump and their employment opportunities
decline. Id. For details of the conversion see Johnson, supra note 29, at
59-60, and McNeeley, supra note 30.
35. In 1974, United States vessels fishing the Eastern Pacific yellowfin
and skipjack grounds included 135 purse seiners with a total carrying
capacity of 104,964 tons, 61 baitboats with a capacity of 5,968 tons, and 7
small trolling vessels with a total capacity of 150 tons. IATTC, 1974 Report,
supra note 4, at 139.
36. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 516 (C. Carry).
37. Id. Longline fishermen catch these larger tunas, which dwell at
depths of 100 to 400 feet, on hooks that are baited with small frozen fish
and suspended from buoyed branch lines of the long main fishing line.
38. Johnson, supra note 29, at 57-58; Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at
571-72. For recent Japanese fishery statistics, see Horikawa, Japan's Tuna
Production (Waga kuni no maguro gyogyo seisan), THE FisIUNG AND FOOD
INDUSTRY WEEKLY (SUIsAN SHUHO), Mar. 25, 1974, at 16-19 (translated and
reprinted by the National Marine Fisheries Service).
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of the fleet's Eastern Pacific catch comes from within 200 miles of
the coast of Latin America; virtually 100 percent of its Atlantic
catch occurs within 200 miles of the African coast.39
PROBLEMS THE 200-MILE ExcLusIvE ECONOMIC
ZONE POSES FOR TUNA FISHERMEN
For the tuna fisherman, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
poses problems of exclusion from fishing grounds and licensing by
coastal nations. Additionally, it creates burdens of increased
transit distances to fishing grounds, decreased protection of crews
and vessels from seizures, and impaired conservation of tuna stocks.
The chief concern of those who depend upon tuna for their liveli-
hood is exclusion from prime fishing grounds. It has been esti-
mated that exclusion from 'the waters within 200 miles of Latin
America and Africa would cause the United States tuna fleet to lose
over 90 percent of its annual catch. 40 Tuna fishermen fear that if
the United States bars foreign fishermen from its coastal waters, it
will establish an international precedent which will induce other
nations to retaliate by excluding United States distant-water fisher-
men from their coastal waters.41
Licensing by the coastal State is less drastic than total exclusion.
Since the developing countries could compensate for lack of fishing
technology by selling fishing rights to the modern distant-water
fishing fleets of the developed nations, it is unlikely that they would
39. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 758 (C. Carry), 775, 814 (A.
Felando). For all the nations that fish the Eastern Tropical Pacific for yel-
lowfin and skipjack, the catch taken within 200 miles of the shore for the
period from 1967 to 1974 averaged 72.2 percent for yellowfin, 91.1 percent
for skipjack, and 78.5 percent overall. Id. at 814. (1974 IATTC figures were
81.1 percent for yellowfin, 87.4 percent for skipjack, and 83.0 percent over-
all.)
40. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 492 (C. Carry); LMR Study,
supra note 4, at 6.
41. See note 13 supra. Indeed, exclusivity constitutes the essence of the
zone. One form of exclusion already familiar to tuna fishermen is seizure.
With a proliferation of 200-mile exclusive economic zones, seizure could
well become the order of the day. On tunaboat seizures, see generally
1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 571-95 (Capt. J. Burich), 607-15 (A.
Felando); Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 573-98; Note, Seizures of
U.S. Fishing Vessels-The Status of the Wet War, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 428
(1969).
exclude these fleets, at least until their own fleets are developed. 42
Whether such licensing arrangements might selectively exclude cer-
tain fishing fleets for political reasons poses a different, more vex-
ing problem for United States tuna fishermen.43 Assuming, how-
ever, that coastal States will grant licenses to United States tuna
fishermen, the question becomes one of total licensing cost to the
fishing vessel which must pursue highly migratory tuna through
the waters of up to ten nations, 44 each of which is free to establish
its own license fee. Even though no single country might charge
an unreasonable fee, the individual boat owner could end up paying
$250,000 or more in license fees without the guarantee of catching
a single fish.45 Such cumulative license fees would have the same
effect as outright political exclusion. Thus, United States tuna fish-
ermen face exclusion, or at best licensing, by the coastal countries
which would control their prime fishing zones. Moreover, absent
bilateral or regional agreements,40 license fees may be arbitrary,
excessive, or even prohibitive to the United States tuna fleet.
47
World-wide 200-mile exclusive economic zones will also create
transit problems to and from fishing grounds. In the territorial
sea, fishing vessels are considered to be involved in innocent passage
only if they comply with the laws and regulations made and pub-
lished by the coastal State.48 Because of broad coastal State dis-
42. Professor H.G. Knight sees licensing as the more likely result if done
in compliance with rules and regulations imposed by the coastal State and
upon payment of fees appropriate to the activity. "Thus, though distant
water fishing may become more expensive, it probably would not be pro-
hibited all together." 1975 Geneva Hearings, upra note 7, at 71. For how
much "more expensive," see Secretary Clingan's conjecture, 1975 Fishery
Hearings, supra note 4, at 107.
43. August Felando, General Manager of the American Tunaboat Associ-
ation, remains skeptical of assuming that other countries will establish a
license system and grant United States tuna fishermen access to fishing
grounds: "[O]nce we agree that the countries have a right to impose any
system they want within 200 miles, we are faced with the reality that...
they can deny licenses or . . . create conditions that, in effect, amount to a
denial .... "1 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 444, 451; accord,
Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 497-98 (H. Cary).
44. See figure 4. A tuna vessel which fishes both the Atlantic and Pacific
grounds might have to purchase twenty or more licenses to insure an un-
impeded pursuit of its prey.
45. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 107 (T. Clingan).
46. To insure stability of license fees and continued access to fishing
grounds, bilateral or multilateral agreements with the coastal States must
be struck. But because of the uncertainty of obtaining such agreements
in light of both past experience and the current political climate in develop-
ing coastal countries, the possibility of retaining access to tuna grounds
under a coastal State licensing system may prove illusory.
47. See note 43 supra.
48. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at
[VOL. 13: 707, 1976] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cretion, 40 however, as a practical matter innocent passage for a
fishing boat does not exist.50 Fishermen fear that many nations
will extend territorial sea principles of innocent passage for fishing
vessels to their exclusive economic zones. 51 This would leave tuna
fishermen two choices; crossing zones at the risk of seizure because
of arbitrary application of innocent passage principles or steaming
seaward 200-plus miles to skirt the zone.52  Detours will prove
costly in time consumed and particularly in extra fuel required;
consequently, increased transit distances will compound already
high operating costs.
53
ff the United States recognizes foreign 200-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zones, tuna fishermen will lose the benefit of reimburse-
ment for seizure within those zones under the Fishermen's Protec-
tive Act of 1967. 5 4 This Act provides for government reimburse-
ment of fines and charges paid to secure release of the vessel. It
also establishes a joint industry-government insurance program
which covers damage to vessel and equipment, loss of catch seized
or spoiled during detention, and 50 percent of the gross income lost
due to seizure and detention of vessels seized on what the United
States recognizes as the high seas. 55 By adopting a 200-mile ex-
clusive economic zone, the United States opens itself to inter-
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 14, para. 5, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
Now this is a livable condition, when you have a 12-mile territorial
sea, or fishing limit. But under a 200-mile fishing limit, a'fishing
vessel that is merely navigating or in transit is in potential diffi-
culty of seizure or harassment beyond 12 miles. 1974 Fishery
Hearings, supra note 1, at 777 (A. Felando).
49. 1975 Geneva Hearings, supra note 7, at 71 n.9 (M. Knight).
50. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 751 (C. Carry).
51. See note 48 supra. Such an exception to freedom of navigation be-
yond the territorial sea, the coastal States might argue, is necessary to pro-
tect their exclusive rights to exploit the living resources of their exclusive
economic zones.
52. Concerning the latter, the inconvenience to the fleet sailing south out
of San Diego harbor, turning sharply to the right, and steaming 200 miles
seaward to avoid the Mexican zone is apparent. 1974 Fishery Hearings,
supra note 1, at 834 (J. Tarantino).
53. With fuel prices rising while supplies decline, tuna fishermen are al-
ready incurring substantially higher operating expenses. As a result of oil
price increases, fleet fuel costs were projected to rise from $11 million in
1973 to $20 million in 1974. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 4.
54. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-79 (Supp. 1975).
55. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 499 (H. Cary).
national pressures to recognize foreign-claimed 200-mile zones.
Since the Act applies only to seizures based on jurisdictional claims
not recognized by the United States Government, the probable
recognition of foreign 200-mile exclusive economic zones would bar
recovery for vessels seized inside 200 miles.58
Establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic zones will seriously
impair existing international tuna conservation regimes and lead
to chaotic unilateral attempts to deal with tuna conservation.5 7
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) has regu-
lated the annual catches of yellowfin in its 5-million-square-mile
Yellowfin Regulatory Area (CYRA) in the Eastern Pacific since
1966.58 The institution of 200-mile exclusive economic zones would
remove from Commission control and place under coastal State con-
56. Section 1972 provides:
In any case where-(a) a vessel of the United States is seized by
a foreign country on the basis of rights or claims in territorial or
the high seas which are not recognized by the United States; and(b) there is no dispute of material facts with respect to the location
or activity of such vessel at the time of such seizure, the Secretary
of State shall as soon as practicable take such action as he deems
appropriate to attend to the welfare of such vessel and its crew
while it is held by such country to secure the release of such vessel
and crew, and to immediately ascertain the amount of any fine,
fee, or other direct charge which may be reimbursable under sec-
tion 1973 (a) of this title.
See the exchange between Senator Tunney and Mr. Felando, concerning
the Act in Hearings on S. 380, supra note 5, at 492-93. H.R. 200 attempts to
cure this defect by amending the Act to add compensation for seizures when
fishing a specific stock of fish "in any area of the high seas" where "vessels
of the United States have previously fished in such area for such stock."
H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. IV, § 401 (1975). The vulnerability of
this amendment lies in its assumption that the exclusive economic zone will
remain part of the high seas. The Informal Single Negotiating Text used
as a basis for negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on Law of
the Sea, insofar as it represents international opinion on the subject, sug-
gests an opposite conclusion. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part II, art. 73,
at 3O (1975).
57. H. Cary, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce
on the 200-Mile Fishery Bill, Sept. 19, 1975, at 4.
58. See figure 3. Thanks to IATTC's conservation efforts, dwindling yel-
lowfin stocks have replenished themselves, thus allowing yearly quotas
to rise steadily. Recently, however, United States tuna fishermen have
grown disenchanted with inequality in quota enforcement within the CYRA.
While the United States Coast Guard polices United States flag vessels
fishing in the CYRA, other member nations decline to police their fishing
vessels. Until resolved, this problem constitutes an additional threat to the
continued effectiveness of the IATTC. See Evening Tribune (San Diego),
Sept. 10, 1975, at B-l, col. 1; San Diego Log, Sept. 1975, at 1, col. 3.
A similar body, the International Commission for the Conservation of At-
lantic Tunas (ICCAT), regulates Atlantic tunas. For a survey of the his-
tory and functions of IATTC, ICCAT, and other international fishery or-
ganizations, see generally A. KoERs, INTmNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE
FIsHFnrs (1973).
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Year % Total Catch % Total Catch % Total Catch
1967 82.9 99.8 93.0
1968 81.7 95.2 87.2
1969 63.0 91.0 72.4
1970 67.9 89.9 74.1
1971 75.0 90.1 82.5
1972 53.7 80.5 58.8
1973 72.0 95.2 77.0
1974 81.1 87.4 83.0
SOURCE: INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION
Figure 4
trol 2.1 million square miles of the CYRA.59 Current CYRA con-
servation measures consist of limiting the total catch in order to
maintain tuna stock at a high level of productivity and the
minimum size in order to maximize the return from each fish
recruited into the fishable stock. Experience demonstrates that
these measures are most effective when applied uniformly to all
fishing within the total area where the particular stock is exploited.
59. See figure 4. Compare 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 443-
44, with Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 371 (A. Felando).
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Where the jurisdictional basis for management does not coincide
with the distribution of the stock, the potential for mismanagement
becomes great. If each of the coastal States were independently
to set a catch quota or size limit for tuna fishing inside its exclu-
sive economic zone, and if another, separate quota or size limit were
established by some other mechanism for the area beyond national
jurisdiction, the result in terms of conservation would be haphazard
and ineffective60 After studying the problem of member nations
extending their jurisdiction to 200 miles, the Commission concluded
that such action would destroy its conservation program. 1
Nearly everyone who has considered this subject has drawn the
same conclusion: unilateral attempts at conservation of highly
migratory species are destined to fail.
6 2
THE TUNA INDUSTRY'S RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS POSED
BY 200-MnE ExcLusIvE ECONOMIC ZONES
Tuna Fishermen
To Southern California tuna fishermen, the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone portends the ruin of their industry.63 Their choices
60. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 573.
61. Mr. Felando expresses concern that if a country feels it has exclusive
control of the tuna within 200 miles of its coast and islands, it will have
a strong incentive not to participate in any cooperative venture. He com-
pares international regulation of the tuna by individual coastal nations to
interstate regulation of a railroad by each of the states it crosses. He con-
cludes it would be a "lousy railroad." 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note
4, at 443. See Mr. Felando's articulate expression of this concern, id. at
442-45; Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 480-82, 728-31. See also
Comment, Tuna Example: Is There Hope for International Cooperation?, 11
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 776 (1974).
62. See, e.g., A. Konas, supra note 58, at 237; Horikawa, supra note 38, at
19; Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 517 (C. Carry quoting Dr. J. Joseph),
728-29 (A. Felando).
63. Captain John Burich, Skipper of the Neptune, which, while operating
on the high seas 75 miles off the coast of Ecuador, was seized on February
1, 1975, and detained 37 days, voiced the view of many:
Mrs. Sullivan: [I]f we should pass a law for the United States
to recognize a 200-mile fishing limit, how would it affect you?
Would you be able to accept that law, as well as the law from
Ecuador and Peru, the 200-mile limit?
Captain Burich: I would have to, whether I liked it or not, if
it was the law of the land.
Mrs. Sullivan: Could you fish within our 200-mile limit and
catch tuna?
-unemployment, relocation, or retraining-depend in large part
upon what action the tunaboat owners will take. Boat owners
have several options: stop fishing and take a loss, switch from
tuna to other species, sell out, relocate under a more favorable flag,
or try to develop new fishing grounds beyond 200 miles from the
coast. The first option, taking a loss, is financially impractical
because of the large investments in individual tunaboats. The
second option, switching to other species, would require adapting
present specialized fishery equipment and techniques. It is unlikely
that a new species could be found which is profitable and which
would not be overfished by the influx of sophisticated tuna
seiners. 64  The development of new fishing grounds beyond 200
miles is uncertain because of undesirable weather, increased transit
distances, and the investment needed to research offshore tuna
migratory patterns.
The most frequently advanced options are selling the boats to
foreign buyers or relocating them in Latin American countries
where access to tuna fishing grounds is assured. In spite of talk
about moving their vessels to foreign flags, industry representatives
conclude that the more practical option is to sell their tunaboats
to foreign buyers-who, recognizing the economic necessity to
United States owners of effecting the sale, will enjoy a buyer's
market.65 Indeed, a number of owners have already sold their
vessels to Mexican buyers. 60 Thus, the overwhelming majority of
the largest vessels are likely to be sold at bargain prices because
of the relative economic advantages of sale over the other options.
The choice to sell, however, may not prove the most economical
option for owners of forty smaller vessels based at San Pedro, Cali-
fornia. Their situation is different, for the fishermen who man
Captain Burich: Inside the 200-miles?
No, it would not be economical at all .... I am quite sure you
could just scuttle the tuna fleet.
Mr. Ruppe: The 200-mile economic zone would be the end of your
business?
Captain Burich: Yes, it would. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra
note 4, at 587, 590.
64. While Pacific albacore stock might sustain such an influx, current
purse seining techniques have proved singularly unsuccessful in attempting
to capture this "flighty fish." See Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at
641-42 (A. Munro).
65. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 796-97 (August Felando, who
represents owners of 95 of the largest tunaboats in the fleet); accord,
Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 505 (Joseph Gann, who represents 13
large tunaboats out of Puerto Rico and San Diego).
66. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 454 (A. Felando).
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these vessels do not depend solely upon tuna fishing for their liveli-
hood. Because these boats are smaller and limited in range, they
fish for tuna only part of the year.67 The remainder of the year
they fish for "wetfish" off the California coast0 8 Although those
who depend most heavily upon tuna may decide to sell their vessels,
other owners may prefer to fish another species or to stop fishing
during the old tuna season.
Tuna fishermen are in a precarious position. "Although highly
skilled, they are specialized and for the most part, cannot adapt
readily to shore occupations."6 9  If the fleet moves, or sells out,
there will be no demand for their skills. While some may eventu-
ally follow the ships, their future course is now uncertain because
foreign countries may limit the number of foreign nationals in boat
crews. Those who remain in the United States face unemployment,
occupation changes, or fishing in other industries.
Tuna Canners
Confronted by similar options, multinational tuna processing
corporations are likely to close or sell their domestic plants in order
to relocate in foreign countries close to the tuna supply.70 Three
factors favor relocation. First, if the United States tuna fleet sells
its ships, 90 percent of the domestic tuna supply will be removed
from the market,7'1 and United States canners will have to look
to foreign suppliers to provide sufficient raw tuna to meet domestic
demand, which is projected to increase to 1.3 billion pounds by
1985.72 Second, the demise of the United States tuna fleet would
cause world production of tuna to drop, at least in the short run,
thereby creating shortages and driving tuna prices up. 3 During
67. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 486 (A. Pisano).
68. Id. at 485. "By wetfish, we mean anchovies, sardines, mackeral[sic] and squid, brought in fresh and wet; thus the name wetfish." Id.
69. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 6.
70. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 763 (statement by Steve
Edney, President, United Cannery and Industrial Workers of the Pacific).
71. See note 40 supra.
72. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
FISHERY STATISTICS No. 6130, BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS 21 (1973).
73. [T]he fishing capacity of distant water States not only exceeds
that of most coastal fishing States, but is also much more mobile.
Consequently, distant water States can adapt their fisheries to nat-
ural changes in the abundance of species more easily than can
coastal fishing States. Thus, an extension of the exclusive rights
of coastal States may very well restrict distant water fisheries
these shortages, foreign canners would probably enjoy preferential
supply from their national tuna fleets. Finally, absent a significant
domestic source of tuna to insure competitive import prices, tuna
exporters and foreign canners could price remaining United States
processors out of the market.74 In light of these factors, tuna
canners will probably relocate their operations in countries where
the tuna supply is more certain.
Tunaboat Builders
The tunaboat building industry possesses a certain flexibility not
shared by tuna fishermen and canners because it depends upon
tuna, not as its source of supply, but as a generator of demand
for its product. When that demand ceases, 7  the immediate loss
of revenue will cause decreased profits and increased unemploy-
ment. Unlike the other industries, however, the tunaboat building
industry's plants and labor force can readily adapt to building other
types of ships. The long-term effect of the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone upon the tunaboat building industry would appear
less severe than its impact on fishermen and canners.
Thus, the problems raised by the 200-mile exclusive economic
zone will probably cause tuna vessel owners to sell their boats to
foreign buyers. Tuna processors will probably relocate in nations
where supply is more certain. Although tunaboat builders may
suffer some short-term losses, they will be able to turn to new ship-
building markets. Widespread unemployment is likely in the fish-
ing and canning industries, and at least on a short-term basis in the
tunaboat building industry. For these reasons, no one in the tuna
industry welcomes an exclusive economic zone.7 6
without resulting in a corresponding expansion of coastal State
fisheries. A. KoERs, supra note 58, at 234-35.
74. The United States is not self-sufficient in raw material for can-
ning, nor can it ever hope to be. However, the flow of domestic
fish provides an efficient mechanism to moderate the price de-
mands by foreign producers for frozen tuna. A rough parallel may
be drawn between the need to control energy supplies and the need
to control our sources of raw tuna. If the United States tuna fish-
ing fleet is crippled economically and/or owners are forced to sell
their vessels to foreign interests, raw tuna prices may escalate to
multiples recently experienced in the oil industry. Such a rise
could result in an additional price tag of one or two billion dollars
per year to the American consumer on a continuing basis. LMR
Study, supra note 4, at 4 (emphasis in original).
75. Domestic demand will cease immediately, and as the sale of modern
United States tuna seiners gluts the market, foreign demand for new seiners
will largely disappear.
76. "I think any person on a fair review of our position would say that
it would ... destroy the U.S. tuna industry as it is now organized."
1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 445 (A. Felando).
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TUNA INDUSTRY TO
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
The importance of the tuna industry to the United States'
economy is integral to understanding the economic impact of the
200-mile exclusive economic zone.
Tuna Canning
The United States consumes over 50 percent of the world's tuna
catch.7  This market has grown six percent in volume and 13
percent in value during each of the past ten years.7 8  Tuna ac-
counts for 74.6 percent of canned fish products for human con-
sumption produced 79 and for 24 percent of the total value of all
fishery products consumed80 in the United States. During 1973,
United States tuna processors packed $714.5 million of canned
tuna,8 1 which sold for over $1 billion to 80 percent of all American
households.8 2 Even though the United States tuna fleet ranks
second among world tuna fleets in volume of catch, in order to
meet domestic market demand, the canning industry must import
about 60 percent of its raw tuna supply.83 Twenty-six tuna
processing plants, employing 16,000 workers and administrators who
77. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 4.
78. Id.
79. Tuna accounted for $826,534,000 of $1,107,722,000 canned fish and
shellfish in 1974. NDvFS, STATIsTIcs, supra note 25, at 34-35.
80. See 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 467 (A. Felando).
81. Processor level value. In addition, the industry packed $33.4 million
of tuna petfood products and $23.0 million of tuna fish meal, oil, and sol-
ubles. These by-products could not profitably be produced apart from the
processing of tuna for human consumption. LMR Study, supra note 4, at
3. See Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 514 (C. Carry).
82. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 736 (C. Carry).
83. In 1974, the United States imported a record 789.4 million pounds of
fresh and frozen tuna. Canners packed 656.7 million pounds, 62.5 percent
(410.2 million pounds) from imported and 37.5 percent (246.6 million
pounds) from domestic tuna. NMIFS, STATIsTIcs, supra note 25, at 2, 55.
Whitemeat tuna (albacore) constitutes about ten percent of the United
States pack from domestic catches, while lightmeat tuna (skipjack, yellow-
fine, and bluefin) provides some 90 percent of the pack from domestic
catches. Over 75 percent of the whitemeat tuna pack comes from imports,
but imports supply only 50 percent of the lightmeat pack. For a thorough
discussion of the significance of the lightmeat/whitemeat distinction, see
Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 735 (A. Felando).
draw a total payroll in excess of $90 million, provide economic sup-
port for the communities of San Diego and San Pedro-Los Angeles,
California; Ponce and Mayaguez, Puerto Rico; American Samoa;
Honolulu, Hawaii; Astoria, Oregon, and Cambridge, Maryland.8 4
The current replacement value of these canneries exceeds $275
million. Two new facilities in San Diego and American Samoa will
be completed in 1975 at a cost of over $30 million. 85 In 1973, the
tuna canning industry spent $58 million for cans and $12 million
for labels, cartons, and vegetable oil.86 Any adverse effect on tuna
processors will have an impact on these industries as well.
Tuna Fishing
In 1974, tuna ranked second in both landing weight (10.8%)
and landing value (17.1%) among all fish and shellfish landed in
the United States and its territories.87 This represented both a
rise in ranking and an increase in landing weight and value (from
8% and 12.2%) since 1972.88 In 1973, for example, the tuna fleet
landed 543 million pounds of tuna (including bonito) worth $135
million on the dock.8 9 Of this, $14 million 0 went to albacore fish-
ing vessels,91 the remainder to tropical tuna vessels. Most of the
$65 million in crew wages and bonuses "flowed into the economy
of southern California, where many of the fishermen and their
families reside."92 Fuel suppliers in San Diego, San Pedro, Ponce,
Mayaguez, and San Juan shared most of the $11 million the fleet
spent for fuel.93 Ten shipyards divided nearly $10 million in main-
tenance, repairs, and support of the fleet, and small provisioners
received $5.4 million for food. Additionally, the fleet paid $2
million for fishing gear, equipment, and supplies; $8 million for
hull, protection and indemnity, and cargo insurance, and $17.5
84. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Actual landings including bonito were 571,112,000 pounds valued at$166,444,000. See NMFS, STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 14-15.
88. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 736 (A. Felando).
89. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 2-3. For 1974 catch figures, see note
87 supra.
90. $21 million in 1974. NMFS, STATiSTiCS, supra note 25, at 15.
91. The smaller vessels of the albacore fleet, which pursue these tem-
perate tunas off the United States Pacific Coast, take 98 percent of their
catch within 200 miles. Albacore, however, in 1974 constituted only nine
percent by weight and 12.8 percent by value of the total United States tuna
catch. Id.
92. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
93. For anticipated price increase, see note 53 supra.
[VOL. 13: 707, 1976] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
million for interest, rentals, and service charges.9 4 In 1974, with
new additions to the fleet and increased fleet revenues of $166.4
million, these expenses, though relatively fixed, may be expected
to rise proportionately.
Tunaboat Building
Tuna vessels have a current replacement value of over $500
million and represent 30 percent of the replacement value of the
United States flag fishing fleet 95 and 50 percent of the number
of vessels over 200 tons.9 6 More importantly, in relation to other
domestic fisheries, tuna represents a major growth industry. 7
Most tuna vessels are built either in San Diego or in Tacoma, Wash-
ington. For the past several years, over 50 percent of United States
dollars spent on new fishing vessels has gone into construction of
tuna vessels. In 1972, tuna vessel construction amounted to $72.5
million ($66.1 millon domestic, $6.4 million foreign) distributed as
follows: $36 million for direct and indirect labor and social bene-
fits for yard employees and subcontractors; $6.4 million to steel sup-
pliers; $4.9 million to main engine manufacturers; $5.1 million to
net and fishing gear suppliers; $8 million to suppliers of power
blocks, winches, hydraulics, refrigeration units, electronics, aux-
iliary engines, and generator equipment.98 "Based upon the
present firm orders in United States yards, this level of tuna vessel
construction is forecast to continue through 1976 and will add more
than $200 million in modern vessels to the fleet during this
period." 99
The United States tuna industry provides direct employment
for 6,800 fishermen, 16,000 cannery workers, and 5,000 tunaboat
builders.100 Loss of the tuna fleet would damage these industries.
94. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 737 (A. Felando).
97. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 2. "Today, Americans really excel in
only one segment of the world's fishing industry. The efficient U.S. tuna
fleet, based in San Diego and Puerto Rico, roams the high seas for its prey,
piles up hefty profits and inspires foreign emulation." Alexander, American
Fishermen Are Missing the Boat, FORTUNE, Sept. 1973, at 192, 196.
98. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 2.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 5.
The fleet also contributes substantially to other commercial enter-
prises including fuel suppliers, small provisioners, fishing gear sup-
pliers, insurance firms, and lending institutions.10 1 Loss of the fleet
will cause a substantial reduction in business volume to members
of these industries. Another less obvious sector affected by loss of
the fleet is local business establishments where the workers from
these industries spend their money.
10 2
THE EcoNomnc CONSEQUENCES CAUSED BY Loss
OF THE UNTED STATES HIGH SEAS TUNA FLEET
Consequences to the National Economy
The national commercial fishing industry will suffer a 17 percent
reduction in yearly landing value and a 23 percent decline in overall
value'0 3 if the United States tuna fleet is forced to sell. Further,
the United States flag fishing fleet stands to lose its largest, most
modern and productive vessels, which constitute 30 percent of the
fleet's current replacement value. Increased raw and canned tuna
imports to offset the loss of domestic catches will severely affect
the trade balance, as will the sale of most of the $500 million tuna
fleet at a loss and the migration of domestic assets in tuna vessels
and canneries to foreign countries where supply is assured. As
American fishermen and canners withdraw from the tuna business,
canned tuna supplies will dwindle, causing prices to skyrocket. 0 4
Loss of the United States high seas tuna fleet will culminate in
an initial loss to the nation's economy of more than one billion
dollars a year. Economists project that each dollar of primary
industry income results in fivefold impact on our nation's econ-
omy.1 1 Thus, 1974 total fleet landings of $166.4 million, com-
bined with new vessel construction projected at $70 million and new
cannery construction of $30 million, a total of 266.4 million, had
an impact of over $1.3 billion on the United States economy.100
101. Id. at 3.
102. See note 106 infra.
103. This decline is measured at four levels: fisherman's value, proces-
sor's value, foreign trade (export/import) value. Hearings on S. 380, supra
note 8, at 736 (A. Felando). Comparable figures for 1974 give tuna an
overall estimated value of $1,329,455,000 or 23.4 percent of the total fishery
value of $5,672,948,000. Computed from NMFS, STATIsTIcs, supra note 25,
at 14-16, 34-35, 39, 45.
104. See note 74 supra.
105. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
106. This is called the "multiplier effect." In assessing the impact of a
change in income or investment upon the economy, it is important to re-
member first that the money one man spends constitutes another man's in-
come and also that an endless chain of such exchanges produces a cumu-
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Obviously, the new construction portion of the figure cannot
be expected to continue indefinitely (although a sustained rate
through 1976 is anticipated), but the fleet operations, which com-
prise two-thirds of the total dollar volume, represent a rapidly
expanding economic base.10 7 This cumulative loss will continue
until other resources or markets are developed to replace revenues
formerly generated by the tuna industry.
Failure of the United States tuna industry will cost up to 50,000
jobs. In 1973, the tuna industry employed 27,800 workers who
earned $203 million.'"08 If the tuna fleet sells out, virtually all
these workers would lose their jobs. Add to these the workers in
support industries, and the scope of potential unemployment be-
comes staggering. At a time when national unemployment stands
at its highest level since the end of World War II, loss of the tuna
industry could add another 50,000 persons to the unemployment
rolls' 0 -primarfly in areas where the unemployment rate has
stood at ten percent or more for the past year.
Consequences to Tuna-Dependent Economies
Southern California
Loss of the tuna industry would have a crippling effect on
Southern California's economy. Tuna makes up over 80 percent
of the value of all fish landed at California ports.110 San Pedro,
California, has led the nation's commercial ports in fish and shell-
lative effect inversely proportional to the rate of savings. Thus, if A spends
X dollars, and the recipient B saves Y percent of this income, only X minus
XY dollars remain for B to spend. From this amount, C, the next recipient,
subtracts the same Y percent for savings, and the process continues until
the ever-smaller portion of X diminishes to nothing. As the rate of savings
decreases the multiplier effect increases. Moreover, any change in income
will cause both consumption and saving to vary in the same direction as,
and by a fraction of, the change in income. From this it follows that an
initial change in the rate of spending or income will cause a chain reaction
which, although of diminishing importance at each successive step, will
cumulate to a multiple change in Net National Product. The multiplier
works in both directions: a small increase in spending can give rise to a
multiple increase in Net National Product, or a small decrease in spending
can precipitate a much larger decrease in Net National Product. C. Mc-
CONNELL, ECONomsc 243-45 (3d ed. 1966).
107. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
108. Id. at 5. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
109. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 763 (S. Edney).
110. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 468 (A. Felando).
fish landing value for the past 26 years; in 1974, San Diego ranked
fourth."1  Together, these two Southern California ports had
over $100 million in landings in 1974;112 only Alaska had more.1 3
Both San Pedro and San Diego boast thriving tuna canning
industries'" and modern tuna fishing fleets. 115 In addition,
San Diego shipbuilders share in the multi-million dollar tunaboat
construction market. Without a sizeable tuna catch, these indus-
tries, their workers, and the economies of San Pedro and San Diego
will suffer. In San Diego alone, loss of the tuna industry would
mean losses of more than $75 million in tuna catch receipts, over
$120 million in projected cannery production, and an estimated $30
million in new tuna vessel construction. Additionally, it would cost
some 4,000 to 5,000 jobs in fishing, canning, and shipbuilding in a
city where unemployment currently exceeds ten percent.' 6  Ap-
plying "the multiple formula applicable to the 'new wealth' gener-
ated by the tuna landed and processed in California,"' 17 the $76
million loss of catch alone will culminate in a local impact of $300
to $530 million." 8 San Pedro, which has fewer tuna fishermen
but more cannery workers, would sustain a similar impact. The
cumulative effect of a loss of the tuna industry upon the economy
of California would be devastating; the potential loss of 80 percent
of its fishing industry, a dozen tuna processing plants, and thou-
111. Compare Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 736, with 1975 Fishery
Hearings, supra note 4, at 468, and NMFS, STATIsTIcs, supra note 25, at 19.
With the replacement of an aging San Pedro cannery by construction of
the new Van Camp tuna factory in San Diego, many San Pedro landings
will shift to San Diego. For example, although San Diego based tunaboats
caught $76,850,000 worth of tuna in 1974, they landed less than a third of
this at San Diego. Compare San Diego Chamber of Commerce, 1975 San
Diego Business Survey, 1975, at 1, with NMFS, STATIsTIcs, supra note 25,
at 19.
112. Their total was $100,903,000 compared to a state total of $130,381,000.
NMNFS, STA~isTics, supra note 25, at 18-19.
113. Id. at 18.
114. San Diego's present tuna cannery, which employs 650 persons on a
payroll in excess of $8.5 million, packed $62 million of canned tuna in 1974
($82 million in 1973 and $62 million in 1972). The new plant, which will
initially employ 1,600 workers, should more than double present canning
capacity. Compare Economic Research Bureau, supra note 5, at 2, with San
Diego Chamber of Commerce, supra note 111, at 1.
115. California-based tuna seiners account for over 70 percent of the
United States flag tuna fleet's $500 million replacement value. Most of these
are based in San Diego, where the 900 fishermen who man them collected
$25,604,720 in wages in 1974. See LAMR Study, supra note 4, at 2. Compare
San Diego Chamber of Commerce, supra note 111, at 4, with Economic
Research Bureau, supra note 5, at 1.
116. San Diego Chamber of Commerce, supra note 111, at 2.
117. A factor "from 4 to 7." 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 804
(A. Felando).
118. See note 106 supra.
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sands of jobs for fishermen, cannery workers, shipbuilders, and
workers in associated industries.
Puerto Rico
Sale of the United States tuna fleet would deal a serious blow to
Puerto Rico's economy. In 1974, United States flag purse seine tuna
vessels landed 30 percent of their tuna at Puerto Rican ports.119
Loss of this domestic source of tuna would jeopardize the jobs of
the 10,000 workers employed in Puerto Rico's five tuna canneries
and threaten those of 5,000 workers in related enterprises such as
trucking, shipping, retail and wholesale food, hardware, and steve-
doring companies. 120  The unemployment resulting from sharply
reduced business in these industries could seriously compound
Puerto Rico's 17 percent unemployment rate.12  Because foreign
flag vessels are not permitted to unload tuna in the continental
United States, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, imports must be relied on
to replace the domestic input.122  Therefore, loss of the United
States tuna fleet to foreign interests would increase the tonnage
of imported frozen tuna required to meet processing needs, add to
processing costs, and adversely affect the foreign trade balance. 23
As a result, the tuna industry in Puerto Rico would be seriously
crippled or eliminated. 24
American Samoa
Erection of global 200-mile exclusive economic zones could
destroy the industrial and employment base of American Samoa
by severely restricting the fishing grounds of its major tuna
suppliers. American Samoa's two tuna canneries 25 depend
largely upon supplies of tuna from Korean and Taiwanese longline
vessels fishing the South Pacific grounds. 26 But enforcement of
exclusive fishing rights in the 200-mile zones surrounding the many
island areas of the South Pacific could either eliminate this fishery
or at least substantially raise operational costs and prices which
119. H. Cary, supra note 57, at 9.
120. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 505 (J. Gann).
121. H. Cary, supra note 57, at 9.
122. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 6.
123. Id.
124. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 505 (J. Gann).
125. NMFS, STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 81. An additional tuna cannery
is nearing completion. See LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
126. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 3.
processors must pay for raw tuna.127 Because tuna and support-
ing industries provide the major labor base for this tiny island of
30,000 inhabitants, disruption of fishing in the South Pacific could
gravely impair American Samoa's economic viability and result in
increased tuna processing costs to be passed along to the United
States consumer. 128
Figure 5
127. Id. at 4. See figure 5.
128. Id.
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THE INTERNATIONAL CONTXT
Establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic zones concerns
every distant-water fishing nation. For example, Japan, the
world's largest tuna supplier, catches 60 to 70 percent of its tuna
within 200 miles of other countries. 129 The combined catches of
Japan and the United States make up 82 percent of the world's
tuna catch.130 Based on the catches of these two countries alone,
no less than 60 percent of the world's tuna catch comes from within
200 miles of foreign shores. 131 Dividing the oceans into a series
of private national lakes will reduce fishing efficiency and increase
operating costs by disrupting efficient fishing patterns which major
distant-water fleets have developed. 132 Tuna fishing is a highly
leveraged enterprise with major fixed expenses; 133 therefore, any
reduction in the yearly volume of tuna captured per vessel will
have a multiple effect upon the cost per ton of production.134
Thus, economic or political exclusion of world tuna fleets from fish-
ing grounds inside these 200-mile national lakes will result in a
decline in efficiency, a rise in costs, and a drop in production. The
tuna industry will stay depressed until developing countries are
able to obtain the technology and cooperation necessary to fully
exploit their tuna stocks.135
Dr. Albert Koers suggests that the goals of regulating marine
fisheries-the maximization of human welfare, the alleviation of
international conflicts, and the optimization of world public order-
may be achieved by either of two means: enhancing the authority
of the coastal State or enhancing the authority of international
fisheries organizations. 136 The 200-mile exclusive economic zone
results from the former approach. In determining how effectively
this course furthers these enumerated goals, one must inquire
129. 1974 Fishery Hearings, supra note 1, at 796.
130. Of more than a million metric tons of tuna caught worldwide, Japan
takes about 650,000 tons, and the United States takes about 250,000 tons.
Id. at 776.
131. See text accompanying notes 40 & 129 supra.
132. LMR Study, supra note 4, at 4.
133. Food, fuel, maintenance, repair, insurance, and financing. Licensing
could also become a significant factor in this list of fixed expenses. Id.
at 5.
134. Id. at 4.
135. See note 73 supra.
136. A. KoERs, supra note 58, at 37-38, 229-30.
whether it maximizes human welfare to deprive the world of a sig-
nificant source of its protein by asserting exclusive coastal State
rights in the absence of the concomitant technology to achieve full
utilization of sea resources;137 whether it alleviates international
conflicts to draw lines on the ocean, lines which fish cannot see,
but which man, nevertheless, must respect; whether it optimizes
world public order to have a series of private national lakes of
varying descriptions dominating a third of the world's oceans.
Clearly, exclusive coastal State authority leads to inefficient
exploitation of fishery resources, proliferation of international con-
flicts, and world fishery chaos.'38 Effective fisheries management
must depend upon international cooperation.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Tuna fishermen know that international cooperation is the only
way effectively to regulate tuna so as to insure its continued sur-
vival as a major food source. These fishermen do not oppose all
200-mile economic zones; they have supported economic zone plans
which exempt highly migratory species. 3 9 Assuming the desirability
of preserving the access of United States tuna fishermen to
their fishing grounds, Professor H.G. Knight's proposed alterna-
tives to a law -of the sea treaty are useful as guidelines for de-
termining appropriate means of achieving this result. 40  Al-
though posited in the broader context of securing national ocean
policy goals in the absence of agreement on a comprehensive law
of the sea treaty, these proposed alternatives are readily adaptable
to the narrower question of securing fishing rights for United States
tuna fishermen inside existing foreign 200-mile exclusive economic
zones. The alternatives span the spectrum of actions available
under international law to effect desired national goals: acquies-
cence, use of force, negotiation or purchase of rights, limited inter-
national agreement, and domestic legislation. Acquiescence, Pro-
137. Although living marine resources are renewable,
[i]f the surplus of a stock of fish is not caught within its life-span,
the result is in physical terms a permanent loss, since exploitation
can not be postponed to a future date as would be feasible in the
case of mineral resources. Whether or not this loss in physical
terms is also a loss in economic terms depends upon such factors
as the demand for the fish in question and the cost of catching
them. Id. at 25.
138. Id. at 242-43.
139. E.g., 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 452 (A. Felando); see
Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 539-41 (J. Royal).
140. Knight, Alternatives to a Law of the Sea Treaty, in 1975 Geneva
Hearings, supra note 7, at 67-75.
[VOL. 13: 707, 1976] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
fessor Knight concedes, "appears to be an unprofitable alternative."
Nevertheless, "each of the other alternatives seems to have some
value, with respect to some subject matter areas, in securing
National ocean policy goals.' 141  Here, the subject matter of
national interest involved is securing fishing rights for tuna fisher-
men inside foreign 200-mile exclusive economic zones.
Use of Force
Advocates of gunboat diplomacy would solve the tuna problem
by armed escort. Besides raising serious questions as to violation
of article two of the United Nations Charter,142 this course of
action could cause international conflict and would require a signifi-
cant increase in military appropriations. 43  Nevertheless, force
may prove an effective method of securing certain objectives when
used on a limited basis in conjunction with the other alternatives.
Because its use to preserve existing rights, rather than to assert
new ones, would probably have the least attendant costs and
adverse reactions, force shows promise as a means-in combination
with others--of preserving for United States tuna fishermen access
to their traditional fishing grounds.
144
Negotiation or Purchase of Rights
Bilateral bargains to secure desired fishing rights in exchange for
like concessions or for payment of a fee could prove useful in pre-
141. Id. at 67.
142. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art 2,
para. 4.
143. Knight, supra note 140, at 72.
144. Id. Another application of force finds advocates in the labor move-
ment. Disgusted with governmental inaction in the face of foreign seizures
of American tunaboats, one labor spokesman warns of protective measures
by the American labor force and retaliation against offending nations' ship-
ping. Insofar as individual tunaboat crews arm themselves to prevent
seizure, they risk both provocation of international incidents and the
prospect of stringent domestic regulation to prevent such self-help mea-
sures. Such well-intentioned efforts of the labor movement could only in-
directly influence the decision of a foreign State to allow United States tuna
fishermen to fish in its waters; moreover, the confrontive nature of dock
strikes and armed resistance could well prove counterproductive. See the
serving existing tuna fishing rights. Unlike the use of force, such
bargains are flexible and allow both parties to profit by exchang-
ing mutually advantageous considerations. Although Latin Ameri-
can countries would probably not be interested in a reciprocal right
to fish off the United States coast, United States tuna fishermen's
continued right to fish in their waters could be tied, for example,
directly to the coastal States' continued right to receive United
States economic and military aid, or to payment of specified license
fees. Past experience, however, casts serious doubts upon prospects
for obtaining protection for the tuna fleet through bilateral agree-
ment.145 Even if established, the success of such agreements
would depend upon the continuance of a favorable local political
climate. Further, negotiating access to foreign economic zone
waters for domestic fishermen would put pressure on our Govern-
ment to grant foreign fishermen similar access to United States
economic zone waters.1 4 6 Thus, while offering some possibilities
for success, bilateral negotiation may well prove a fruitless
alternative as a practical matter.
Limited International Agreement
Regional multilateral agreements which recognize special excep-
tions for, and international regulation of, highly migratory fisheries
are a possibility. Variations include imposition of regional fees
based on fish caught,'1 47 or a system of uniform fees. 148  To
manage tuna effectively, these agreements should cover both high
seas and territorial seas.149 Moreover, if drawn with a view
toward developing international law, such agreements could in time
establish exceptions for highly migratory species as a rule of
customary international law. 50
testimony of John J. Royal, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Fishermen and
Allied Workers' Union, ILWU, in 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at
598.
145. Except for the Brazilian shrimp agreement, the United States has
no bilateral fishery agreements with Latin American countries, and "there
is not much reason to believe we will be successful in negotiating anything
down south." 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4 at 451. See note 46 supra.
146. Knight, supra note 140, at 72. Popular resistance to licensing Soviets
to fish haddock off the New England coast or Japanese to fish salmon off
the North Pacific coast within economic zone waters may provide a clue
to the Government's inability to obtain fishery agreements for domestic dis-
tant-water fisheries south of the border.
147. 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 107 (T. Clingan).
148. Id. at 452 (A. Felando).
149. Hearings on S. 380, supra note 8, at 517 (C. Carry quoting Dr. J.
Joseph).
150. Knight, supra note 140, at 73.
[VOL. 13: 707, 1976] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Domestic Legislation
Domestic legislation could serve as a model to be copied by other
coastal nations. Such legislation, while protecting United States
interests, could catalyze the development of new customary inter-
national law.' 51 Forwardlooking legislation would probably be
most fruitful in the protection of domestic coastal fisheries. The
danger lies in protecting coastal fisheries at the expense of distant-
water fishing interests. While proposals such as implementation
of the 1945 Truman Fisheries Proclamation' 52 and Article VII
of the Geneva Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Liv-
ing Resources of the High Seas' 53 offer substantial protection for
coastal fisheries without impairing distant-water fishing rights,
other more sweeping and exclusive proposals to protect United
States coastal fisheries threaten the continued existence of do-
mestic distant-water fishing fleets if followed by foreign coastal
States. 5 4 The difficulty of developing far-sighted legislation
which, if emulated by other coastal nations, would adequately pro-
tect United States distant-water fishing interests is compounded
by the uncertainty that these nations would copy such legisla-
tion.1 55 While domestic legislation alone cannot secure access to
foreign tuna fishing grounds, it could aid in achieving an acceptable
solution when used in conjunction with the other alternatives.
Indeed, it would appear that in a world with 200-mile exclusive
economic zones, United States tuna interests might be protected
most adequately through a combination of limited treaties, domestic
legislation, purchase of rights, and the occasional application of
force.155
CONCLUSION
This Comment has focused upon the detrimental effects a current
trend in law of the sea could have on a particular highly migratory,
151. Id. at 74.
152. 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945), reprinted in Hearings on S. 380, supra
note 8, at 535.
153. Done at Geneva, Apr. 28, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285.
154. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
155. Knight, supra note 140, at 74.
156. See id. at 75.
distant-water fishery. The 200-mile exclusive economic zones do
not yet exist on a global basis, and those few which do exist defy
customary international law.157 In the face of the growing tide
favoring their adoption, however, the United States has an op-
portunity to influence both the resulting nature of these zones
and the means used to establish them. The essence of the tuna
problem is the separation of technology from resource. While
-the United States possesses the technology to fish tuna at max-
imum economy, the developing coastal States will claim exclu-
sive rights to tuna crossing their economic zones. Such a severance
of resource and technology ignores the nature of the highly migra-
tory fishery. Dr. Koers suggests that the three most desirable ele-
ments of the future international law of marine fisheries are a
global conservation organization, improved regional fisheries com-
missions, and coastal State preferential rights.158 Adapted to
distant-water, highly migratory fisheries, coastal State preferential
rights translate into a recognition of foreign fishing rights subject
to international agreement or regulation by regional fisheries com-
missions. 59 These elements show a clear course of action which
will bring together technology and resource, thereby insuring pro-
tection of tuna stocks for future generations. These guidelines
require a recognition by coastal States of the unique nature of
highly migratory fisheries and acceptance of international coop-
erative regulation of these fisheries. They also require the strength-
ening 'of regional tuna regulatory commissions and the establish-
ment of a global tuna conservation organization to work with the
regional commissions.
This is the course the United States Government must pursue
if its distant-water tuna industry is to survive. It must utilize
every means available-law of the sea negotiations, limited interna-
tional agreements, domestic legislation, purchase of rights, and
occasional application of force-to achieve these ends. But because
a comprehensive and universally accepted treaty from the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference would provide the best oppor-
tunity to further these ends, the employment of alternate means
which might jeopardize such an agreement should be held in abey-
ance until the Conference either concludes such a treaty or ends in
failure. The alternative to a treaty, a world-wide extension of ex-
clusive fishing rights through unilaterally asserted 200-mile exclu-
157. Letter from Professor Louis Henkin to Congressman Robert Leggett,
Mar. 5, 1975, reprinted in 1975 Fishery Hearings, supra note 4, at 173-75.
158. A. KOERS, supra note 58, at 279.
159. Cf. id. at 292-95, 317-18.
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sive economic zones, would destroy the United States high seas tuna
fleet and damage -the national economy. There is little reason to
hope that, failing agreement on a comprehensive treaty, coastal
States will permit individually through bilateral agreement what
collectively they denied.
The tuna problem is global because it involves a highly migratory
fish. Consequently, the community of nations must realize that
world-wide cooperation is the only effective way to manage this
valuable ocean resource. The United States Government must
strive to disseminate an understanding of the uniqueness of the
tuna fishery so as to gain affirmative commitments from other
coastal States to defer to regional regulation of tuna fishing both
within and beyond their exclusive economic zones. For only
through recognition of the uniqueness of tuna as a highly migratory
fish, application of global tuna conservation efforts, and strengthen-
ing of regional tuna regulatory organizations can both fish and
fishermen survive.
F. DAVID FROmAN
